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A WHOLE NEW WORLD OF FALSE-CLAIMS-ACT 
LIABILITY: THE 2009 AMENDMENTS AND 
LEARNING WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE 
David Baker+ 
Justice Stephen Breyer described the danger of reading the False Claims Act 
(FCA) expansively when he stated, “government money today is in everything.  
So if it’s in everything, then everything is going to become subject to this False 
Claims Act.”1  To limit the scope of the FCA, the Supreme Court unanimously 
held in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders that the FCA 
applies only to those who intentionally defraud the government.2  However, 
Congress opposed the Court’s decision and amended the FCA through the 
Fraud and Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA),3 which allow entities 
with no nexus to the government to face FCA liability.4  This latest iteration of 
the statute creates problems of vagueness and overbreadth and perverts the 
statute’s original purpose of combating fraud against the government.5 
The Supreme Court based its Allison Engine decision on the “presentment 
clause” in the FCA, which required that a false claim be presented to the 
government itself for an individual to be prosecuted under the auspices of the 
Act.6  When Congress amended the statute, however, it removed the language 
and eliminated the presentment requirement.7  Rather, the current version of 
                                                 
 +  J.D. Candidate, May 2012, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
M.A., 2007, Queen's University of Belfast; B.A., 2006, Queen's University of Belfast.  The author 
would like to thank Tom Holliday for his expertise and invaluable insight, Jen Siegel for her 
feedback, and Jack Raffeto for his recommendations and guidance throughout the writing 
process.  He would also like to thank his wife, Adrienne, for her loving support, patience, and 
encouragement, and the members of the Catholic University Law Review for their diligent work. 
 1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 
553 U.S. 662 (2008), superseded by statute, Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 31 
U.S.C.) (No. 07-214).  Justice Scalia echoed this sentiment, and stated that the FCA  “doesn’t 
have to cover every ill in the world.”  Id. at 37. 
 2. 553 U.S. at 671–72. 
 3.  FERA, §4(a)(1), 123 Stat. at 1621–25. 
 4. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 5. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1–2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266–67 
(stating the purpose of the FCA is to combat fraud and “recover losses sustained as a result of 
fraud against the Government”); see also CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 956 (1863). 
 6. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006). 
 7. FERA, § 4(a)(1), 123 Stat. 1617 at 1621 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.  
§ 3729(a)(1)(B) (Supp. III 2009)).  Currently, liability attaches under this section when a person 
“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a 
false or fraudulent claim.”  31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B).  The section’s predecessor originally read: 
“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or 
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the FCA predicates liability on the submission of a false claim to recipients of 
government money where a government interest is advanced.8  
The FCA’s amendments are reminiscent of those made to the mail-fraud 
statute, which Congress enacted to combat fraud perpetrated through the U.S. 
Postal Service.9  After the Supreme Court limited the scope of the mail-fraud 
statute,10 Congress expanded its applicability through ambiguous 
amendments,11 contributing to decades of arbitrary prosecutions.12  Decades 
elapsed before the Supreme Court addressed the problems created by 
Congress’s overzealousness and the resulting legal chaos caused by disparate 
lower-court rulings under the mail-fraud statute.13  The Supreme Court—or 
Congress—must now act swiftly to avoid the same result in relation to the 
FCA, lest entire industries endure decades of uncertainty regarding the rules 
governing their business conduct.14 
                                                                                                                 
fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government.”  Id. § 3729(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis 
added). 
 8. FERA, § 4(a)(2), 123 Stat. 1617 at 1623 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.  
§ 3729(b)(2) (Supp. III 2009)). 
 9. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, §§ 149 and 301, 17 Stat. 302, 323 (repealed 1909) 
(criminalizing the use of the mail system for “any scheme or artifice to defraud”).  Enacted in 
1952, the wire-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, is a descendant of the mail-fraud statute, with 
nearly identically wording and construction. See Peter R. Ezersky, Intra-Corporate Mail and 
Wire Fraud: Criminal Liability for Fiduciary Breach, 94 YALE L.J. 1427, 1429 n.8 (1985) 
(explaining that “[t]he mail and wire fraud statutes have been identically construed”); Jed S. 
Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 772 n.6 (1980).  These 
two statutes combined target a “full range of consumer frauds, stock frauds, land frauds, bank 
frauds, insurance frauds, and commodity frauds, [and also] . . . such areas as blackmail, 
counterfeiting, election fraud, and bribery.”  Rakoff, supra, at 772.  Because the mail- and  
wire-fraud statutes are so similar, and judicial decisions addressing one are usually applicable to 
the other, this Comment will concentrate on the more frequently used mail-fraud statute.  See, 
e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987) (“The mail and wire fraud statutes 
share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the same analysis to [the mail 
and wire fraud] offenses here.”). 
 10. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (noting the statute should be 
“limited in scope to the protection of property rights”), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)). 
 11. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. at 4508 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 
(2006)) (“For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a 
scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”). 
 12. See infra Part I.H.  Although the mail-fraud statute is a criminal statute and the FCA is a 
civil statute, the FCA’s hefty fines and treble damages resemble criminal sanctions.  See 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
 13. See infra Part I.H. 
 14. See Robert J. Wagman, The Risks of Doing Business with the Government Are Getting 
Riskier, 47 ADVOC. 62, 62–68 (2009) (discussing the unique challenges presented by doing 
business with the government).  An expansive application of the FCA poses a particular problem 
for defense contractors, as defense contracts are often very large and complex and the contractors 
themselves often subcontract with other companies.  See Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex 
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This Comment advocates limiting the FCA to reflect its core  
purpose—combating the fraudulent presentment of false claims to the 
government.  Part I provides a legislative and statutory history of the FCA, 
examines the FCA’s purpose, and summarizes both the Supreme Court’s 
Allison Engine decision and the subsequent FERA amendments.  In addition, 
this Part offers a brief history of the mail-fraud statute and describes the issues 
that arose when the Supreme Court remedied the statutory vagueness.  Part II 
explores the consequences of FCA overbreadth by comparing the FCA to the 
mail-fraud statute and outlining the significance of the economic and judicial 
costs of the amendments.  Part III argues for a legislative or judicial remedy to 
prevent expansion of the FCA’s scope.  It proposes two legislative solutions: 
either eliminating current ambiguities in the FCA’s definition of “claim,” or 
including a mandatory arbitration or mediation requirement before the 
commencement of litigation.  Finally, in the absence of a legislative remedy, 
the Supreme Court should narrowly interpret the ambiguous term “claim” in 
the FCA. 
I.  THE FCA AND THE MAIL-FRAUD STATUTE 
Both the FCA and the mail-fraud statute originated in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century.15  This Part traces the statutes from their beginnings to their 
current iterations and highlights relevant milestones along the way. 
A. The Purpose of the FCA 
During the last twenty-five years, the FCA has been the foremost  
civil-enforcement tool in combating fraud against the government.16  The 
statute gained popularity as an antifraud weapon because of its treble damages 
and heavy penalty provisions.17 
1.  Origins of the FCA and Concerns About Waste in Wartime 
Congress first enacted the FCA in 1863 against the backdrop of the 
American Civil War.18  Known as the Informer’s Act, the statute permitted 
private qui tam informers to initiate fraud actions on behalf of the 
                                                                                                                 
rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 671–72 (2008), superseded by statute, FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 
4(a)(1),123 Stat. 1617, 1621–25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.). 
 15. See JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS 1-6 (4th ed. 2011) 
(noting the FCA’s origin); Ezersky, supra note 9, at 1428 (discussing the purpose of the  
mail-fraud statute, which Congress enacted in 1870). 
 16. See BOESE, supra note 15, at 1-5 to 1-6 (noting the 1986 amendments helped make the 
FCA the potent force that it is today).  Between 1987 and 2010, FCA judgments and settlements 
totaled over $27 billion.  Fraud Statistics-Overview: October 1, 1987–September, 30 2010, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs-forms/C_FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 4, 2011). 
 17. BOESE, supra note 15, at 1-5. 
 18. See id. § 1.01[A], at 1-8 (providing a brief overview of the origins of the FCA). 
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government.19  The statute was “aimed at bringing to punishment those who 
commit frauds upon the Government and to recover money that has been 
obtained by fraud from the U.S. Government under contracts between the 
Government and private citizens.”20  Although the Act “was applicable to 
fraud by government claimants generally,” it primarily targeted  
military-procurement fraud.21  
Private military contractors contributed to widespread abuse and fraud 
during this time22—a problem magnified by the complexity of the Union 
government’s wartime spending.23  Recognizing the enormity of the problem, 
the legislative debates before the statute’s enactment focused on “ferreting out 
and punishing these enormous frauds upon [the] Government.”24   
As government spending fell after the Civil War, so did interest in the 
FCA.25  However, during the 1930s and 1940s, with the passage of the New 
Deal and increased military spending preceding World War II, the FCA once 
again drew Congress’s attention.26  Congress’s amendments to the statute in 
                                                 
 19. See BOESE supra note 15, § 1.01[A], at 1-9.  The original statute required qui tam 
litigants to pay their legal costs and fees; this provision aimed to prevent frivolous qui tam 
lawsuits from overburdening the courts. Id. § 1.01[A], at 1-12.  See infra Part I.D. for an 
explanation of qui tam actions. 
 20. 89 CONG. REC. 7596 (1943) (statement of Sen. William Chapman Revercomb). 
 21. BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.01[A], at 1-12 (citations omitted). 
 22. See United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. Inc., 722 F. Supp. 
607, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (“‘For sugar it [the government] often got sand; for coffee, rye; for 
leather, something no better than brown paper; for sound horses and mules, spavined beasts and 
dying donkeys; and for serviceable muskets and pistols, the experimental failures of sanguine 
inventors, or the refuse of shops and foreign armories.’” (quoting FRED ALBERT SHANNON, THE 
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNION ARMY, 1861–1865, at 58 (1965))); see 
also J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam 
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 555 (2000) (revealing that contractors provided the Union 
Army with “artillery shells filled with sawdust rather than explosives”). 
 23. BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.01[A], at 1-8. 
 24. CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 956 (1863) (statement of Sen. Henry Wilson).  
Senator Jacob M. Howard, the principal sponsor of the bill, called it a “crying evil[] of the  
period . . . that [the] Treasury is plundered from day to day by bands of conspirators, who are 
knotted together in this city and other large cities for the purpose of defrauding and plundering 
the Government.”  Id. at 955–56 (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard).  The text of the Act itself also 
reflected the specific purpose of combating fraud against the government: 
[The Act targeted persons] who shall make or cause to be made, or present or cause to 
be presented for payment or approval to or by any person or officer in the civil or 
military service of the United States, any claim upon or against the Government of the 
United States . . . knowing such claim to bo [sic] false, fictitious, or fraudulent . . . for 
the purpose of obtaining, or aiding in obtaining, the approval or payment of such  
claim . . . . 
An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United States, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 
696, 696 (1863). 
 25. See BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.01[B], at 1-13. 
 26. Id. (stating that this increase in spending created opportunity, once again, for fraud 
against the government). 
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1943 left the traditional purpose of the FCA unchanged, while shifting the 
FCA’s focus to “‘parasitic’ qui tam suits”—a change that made it more 
difficult for private individuals to bring suits on behalf of the government. 27  
2.  A Large National Deficit and New Concerns About Waste: The 1986 
Amendments 
The “growing pervasiveness” of fraud against the government led to further 
amendments in 1986.28  Fear, caused by the dramatically increased national 
deficit, provided the impetus for the amendments29 and contributed to an 
atmosphere analogous to when Congress first passed the Act in 1863—a time 
when fraud against the government “was seen as posing a severe threat to 
national interests.”30   
The 1986 amendments to the FCA reflected the perceived danger to the 
national purse.31  Among other changes, Congress lowered the standard of 
intent for certain violations of the FCA, lengthened the statute of limitations, 
increased the severity of the damages and penalty provisions, and increased the 
qui tam litigants’ percentage of successful recoveries.32  These amendments 
turned the FCA into the federal government’s foremost antifraud statute.33 
Despite these amendments, the historic purpose of the FCA remained intact, 
as evidenced by an accompanying Senate report, which explicitly stated that 
the amendments were intended “to enhance the Government’s ability to 
recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against the Government.”34  The 
                                                 
 27. See Brief for the Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 11 & n.2, Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (2008), 
superseded by statute, Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 
Stat. 1617 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.) (No. 07-214). 
 28. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266.  The 
number of fraud investigations conducted by the Department of Defense rose thirty percent 
between 1982 and 1984; similarly, from 1983 to 1986, the Department of Health and Human 
Services “nearly tripled the number of entitlement program fraud cases referred for prosecution.”  
Id., 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5267. 
 29. See BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.04[A], at 1-20; see also Summary of Receipts, Outlays, 
and Surpluses or Deficits (-): 1789–2016, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals (last visited Aug. 20, 2011) [hereinafter 
Summary of Budget Receipts].  In 1979, the budget deficit was $40.7 billion dollars; six years 
later it stood at $221.2 billion.  Id. 
 30. See BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.04[A], at 1-20 to 1-21. 
 31. Id. § 1.04[A], at 1-19 to 1-21. 
 32. See False Claims Amendments Act (FCAA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 2, 100 Stat. 
3153, 3153–54 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2006)).; see also BOESE, supra note 
15, § 1.04[B], 1-21 to 1-25 (“The amendments for the first time defined the term ‘knowingly’ to 
make clear that a showing of ‘specific intent to defraud is no longer required.’” (internal footnote 
omitted)). 
 33. See Fraud Statistics-Overview,  supra note 16.  In 1987, relators filed only thirty new 
qui tam cases and failed to collect any rewards.  Id. Ten years later, qui tam litigants filed 547 
new cases and collected over $67.5 million in rewards.  Id. 
 34. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1–2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266–67. 
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report further noted that “[t]he False Claims Act is intended to reach all 
fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money or to 
deliver property or services.”35  The report also quoted Justice Hugo Black, 
who called the statute “a remedial one . . . intended to protect the Treasury 
against the hungry and unscrupulous host that encompasses it on every side.”36  
Similarly, the House report accompanying the amendments emphasized the 
need to recoup government losses given the country’s financial situation. 37  
3.  The FERA Amendments: An Even Bigger Economic Crisis 
The factors instigating the 2009 FERA legislation were very similar to the 
circumstances giving rise to both the original FCA in 1863 and the 1986 
amendments.  High government spending and worries about defrauders 
exploiting the country during crisis motivated legislative action.38  This time, 
                                                 
 35. Id. at 9, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5274. 
 36. Id. at 11, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5276 (quoting United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 
(D. Or. 1885)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 99-660, at 18 (1986). 
[A]ctive enforcement of this statute will not only result in a recovery of losses resulting 
from fraud, but that it will also serve as a deterrent to those who otherwise might 
consider defrauding the Government.  Moreover, given the current budgetary situation, 
it is imperative that the Government recoup these fraud losses and deter future 
fraudulent activities that result in further losses to the Government. 
Id. 
 38. See S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 1–2 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 431.  The 
Senate report began with an explanation of how the existing environment actually invited fraud, 
and thus necessitated legislative intervention: 
  Our Nation is in the midst of its most serious economic crisis since the Great 
Depression.  With each passing week, tens of thousands more Americans lose their jobs 
to layoffs, and many thousands more are losing their homes to foreclosure.  As we learn 
more and more each day about the causes of this debacle, it is clear that unscrupulous 
mortgage brokers and Wall Street financiers were among the contributors to this 
economic collapse.  With the new tools and resources in this bill, it will be easier to 
ensure that all of those responsible for these financial crimes are held accountable. 
  While the full scope of the fraud that helped trigger the economic crisis is still 
unknown, we do know a great deal about what went wrong.  As banks and private 
mortgage companies relaxed their standards for loans, approving ever riskier mortgages 
with less and less due diligence, they created an environment that invited fraud.  Private 
mortgage brokers and lending businesses came to dominate the home housing market, 
and these companies were not subject to the kind of banking oversight and internal 
regulations that had traditionally helped to prevent fraud.  We are now seeing the 
results of this lax supervision and accountability. 
  . . . . 
  Of course, the problem is not limited to mortgage frauds.  As is so common in 
today’s financial markets, home mortgages were packaged together and turned into 
securities that were bought and sold in largely unregulated markets on Wall Street.  
Here again, the environment invited fraud.  As the value of the mortgages started to 
decline with falling housing prices, Wall Street financiers began to see these  
mortgage-backed securities unravel.  Unfortunately, some were not honest about these 
securities, leading to even more fraud and victimizing investors nationwide. 
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however, the amendments exclusively emphasized the need to rein in the 
financial sector and to recover money lost to fraud.39  Despite this purported 
goal, neither the Act itself nor the legislative history reflected any limitations 
along those lines. 
Before the 2009 amendments, Representative Howard L. Berman, an author 
of both the 1986 and 2009 legislation, delivered mixed messages regarding the 
bill’s purpose.40  Berman stated that the amendments updated the law to 
incorporate modern fraud schemes that drain the public purse.41  He then 
explained that the FCA protects “all Government funds and property, without 
qualification or limitation.”42  Together, these statements suggest that he 
believes the FCA’s scope should be limitless in its pursuit of fraud against the 
government, rather than limitless in the type of fraud to which it applies.  
                                                                                                                 
Id.  The 2009 amendments came at a time of high government spending and outsourcing.  See 
Summary of Budget Receipts, supra note 29 (showing that the 2010 federal budget was an 
estimated $3.8 trillion—the largest since the Office of Management and Budget  (OMB) 
recording began).  The combined cost to the U.S. government of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is 
nearly $1 trillion.  Richard Wolf, Afghan War Costs Now Outpace Iraq’s, USA TODAY, May 13, 
2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2010-05-12-afghan_N.htm#.  American military 
action abroad has increased opportunities for business transactions with the American 
government.  See MOSHE SCHWARTZ & JOYPRADA SWAIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40764, 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ: BACKGROUND AND 
ANALYSIS 6–7 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf (noting that the 
number of contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan is nearly equal to the number of the Department of 
Defense’s uniformed personnel). 
 39. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 3–4, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 433.  The Senate report explicitly 
states that the 2009 amendments are designed to “protect from fraud the Federal assistance and 
relief funds expended in response to our current economic crisis.”  Id. at 4, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
433.  The report later refers to the need to protect the $1 trillion spent on stabilizing the banking 
system from “fraud or abuse.”  Id., 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 432.  Furthermore, FERA’s legislative 
history repeatedly refers to the FCA in the context of recovering federal funds lost to fraud.  See 
id. at 1, 9–10, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 436–37.  Indeed, the title of the legislation is the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act.  Id. at 1, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 430 (emphasis added). 
 40. 155 CONG. REC. E1295 (daily ed. June 3, 2009) (statement of Rep. Howard Berman). 
 41. Id. at E1295–300.  
 42. Id. at E1296.  Representative Berman further noted: 
In defining the word “claim” so broadly, Congress intended in 1986 to make sure that 
the FCA would impose liability even if the claims or false statements were made to a 
party other than the Government, if the payment thereon could potentially result in a 
loss to the Government or cause the Government to wrongfully pay out money.  For 
example, because any fraud that reduces the effectiveness of programs and initiatives 
the Government has sought to advance also undermines the Government’s purpose in 
supplying funding support, Congress intended for a false claim to the recipient of a 
grant from the United States or to a State under a program financed in part by the 
United States, to be considered a false claim to the United States. 
Id. 
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4.  Judicial Interpretations of the FCA’s Purpose 
The Supreme Court recognized that the primary purpose of the FCA 
naturally placed restraints on its scope.  In 1943, the Court in United States ex 
rel. Marcus v. Hess articulated that the FCA’s purpose was “to provide for 
restitution to the government of money taken from it by fraud.”43  The Court 
believed that Congress had included the then-double damages provisions to 
ensure that the government was completely reimbursed.44  Fifteen years later, 
however, the Supreme Court stated in United States v. McNinch that although 
“Congress wanted to stop this plundering of the public treasury . . . . it is 
equally clear that the False Claims Act was not designed to reach every kind of 
fraud practiced on the Government.”45  The Court recognized that Congress 
wanted to protect government money and property, but only from fraudulent 
claims against the government.46   
The circuit courts agree with the Supreme Court’s reading of the FCA’s 
purpose.  The Third Circuit noted that the FCA targets “fraudulent activity 
which attempts to or actually causes economic loss to the United States 
government.”47  Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has connected liability under the 
Act to fraudulent claims intended to deprive the government of money,48 and 
the Eleventh Circuit has held that liability hinges on “actionable damage to the 
public fisc.”49  Likewise, the Fourth Circuit requires a “call upon the 
government fisc” for liability to attach.50 
B.  The “Presentment Clause” 
Since its inception, the FCA has required the presentation of a false claim to 
the government.51  Section 3729(a)(1) of the United State Code makes this 
requirement an explicit prerequisite for liability,52 and the judiciary had 
                                                 
 43. 317 U.S. 537, 551 (1943), superseded by statute Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 
608  (repealed 1968). 
 44. Id. at 551–52. 
 45. United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958) (internal footnote omitted); cf.  
United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968) (explaining that the FCA reaches 
“all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money”). 
 46. See Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958). 
 47. Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 48. See Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 677 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[O]nly those 
actions by the claimant which have the purpose and effect of causing the United States to pay out 
money it is not obligated to pay, or those actions which intentionally deprive the United States of 
money it is lawfully due, are properly considered ‘claims’ within the meaning of the FCA.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 49. United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 
2002). 
 50. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 51. See An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United States, ch. 
67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863). 
 52. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
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implicitly included it in § 3729(a)(1)(B)53 until the FERA amendments in 
2009.54  Even when Congress recodified the FCA in 1982,55 it intentionally 
preserved the substance of the Act.56 
The circuit courts have highlighted the relationship between the presentment 
of a false claim, the FCA’s purpose of combating fraud against the 
government, and the scope of the Act.57  In United States ex rel. Clausen v. 
Laboratory Corp. of America, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that “[w]ithout 
the presentment of such a claim, while the practices of an entity that provides 
services to the Government may be unwise or improper, there is simply no 
actionable damage to the public fisc as required under the False Claims Act.”58  
In United States v. Rivera, the First Circuit similarly explained that “the statute 
attaches liability, not to the underlying fraudulent activity or to the 
government’s wrongful payment, but to the ‘claim for payment.’”59  Quoting 
this language, the Fourth Circuit later agreed and added that “a central question 
in FCA cases is whether the defendant ever presented a ‘false or fraudulent 
claim’ to the government.”60  
Most recently, in United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the presentment 
requirement applied to § 3729(a)(2) of the FCA.61  In an opinion authored by 
then-Chief Judge John Roberts, the D.C. Circuit noted that § 3729(a)(1) 
unambiguously requires presentment of a false claim; therefore, the court did 
not need to “debate the legislative history” to interpret the statute.62  
Furthermore, the court read a presentment requirement into § 3729(a)(2), and 
noted that the explicit presentment requirement in § 3729(a)(1) would be 
                                                 
 53. See infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 54. See infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 55. See BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.02[A], at 1-16. 
 56. H.R. REP. NO. 97-651, at 3 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1895, 1897. 
 57. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
 58. 290 F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River 
Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
 59. 55 F.3d 703, 709 (1st Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). 
 60. Harrison, 176 F.3d at 785.  The Supreme Court concurred based on a slightly different 
rationale in Allison Engine, and argued that such an interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) 
“protect[s] the Government from loss due to fraud but also ensures that ‘a defendant is not 
answerable for anything beyond the natural, ordinary and reasonable consequences of his 
conduct.’”  Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008) 
(quoting Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 470 (2006)), superseded by statute, 
FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
18 and 31 U.S.C.). 
 61. 380 F.3d 488, 500–01 (D.C. Cir. 2004), superseded by statute, FERA, 123 Stat. 1617. 
 62. Id. at 492–96. 
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otherwise meaningless.63  District courts in several circuits have since followed 
the Totten rationale.64 
The Totten court foresaw the dangers of an FCA unfettered by a presentment 
requirement.65  Abolition of the presentment clause, the court reasoned, would 
render “the potential reach of the Act almost boundless.”66  The court 
explained that without such a clause, liability could attach to any  
institution—such as a college—that had received some federal funding.67  
Furthermore, deciding the amount of federal money needed to cross the 
liability threshold is “an imprecise line of demarcation” and would likely result 
in increased collateral litigation under the FCA.68 
C.  The Definition of “Claim” for the Purposes of the FCA 
Without a “claim,” there can be no liability under the FCA.69  Although the 
FCA is arguably restricted to fraudulent attempts to acquire government 
money or property,70 the definition of “claim” has expanded since the Act was 
amended in 1986. 
Before the 1986 amendments, little Supreme Court case law existed that 
defined “claim.”71  In United States v. Cohn, the Court held that the fraud must 
involve “a ‘claim upon or against’ the United States and the Treasury 
Department.”72  The Supreme Court later strengthened the idea that a “claim” 
involved a demand for government money in McNinch, and stated that “the 
concept[] of a claim against the government normally connotes a demand for 
money or for some transfer of public property.”73 
                                                 
 63. Id. at 501. 
 64. See, e.g., United States v. City of Hous., No. H-03-03713, 2006 WL 2382327, at *6 
(S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (finding that the City’s use of previously approved and allocated 
Housing and Urban Development funds did not constitute the presentment of a claim to the 
government under the FCA); United States v. Sequel Contractors, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 
1150 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (explaining that Totten “did not require that the defendants themselves 
directly present the false claim to the federal government . . . [but rather] that someone must 
directly present [the] false claim”); United States ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup III. Inc., No. 02-C-
6074, 2005 WL 2667207, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 2005) (holding that false claims submitted to a 
Medicaid intermediary satisfied the presentment requirement). 
 65. Totten, 380 F.3d at 496. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 497. 
 69. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (Supp. III 2009). 
 70. See United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968) (stating that the FCA 
applies to “all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money”). 
 71. See BOESE, supra note 15, § 2.02[A], at 2-85 (stating that the Supreme Court addressed 
this issue only three times before 1986). 
 72. 270 U.S. 339, 346–47 (1926). 
 73. United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958) (quoting United States v. Tieger, 
234 F.2d 589, 591 (3d Cir. 1956)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2011] False Claims Act Liability: Where to Draw the Line 211 
Then, with the 1986 amendments, Congress defined “claim” for the first 
time.74  This definition significantly expanded the term beyond prior 
interpretations,75  by extending FCA liability to those who submit false claims 
to recipients of government money.76 
Since the 1986 amendments were enacted, courts have held that the term 
“claim” applies to a wide variety of submissions,77 including: progress reports 
on the status and success of a software system,78 a primary contractor’s false 
billing certifications for subcontractors,79 false certifications of compliance 
with Medicare,80 and false representations by a university to secure federal 
education subsidies.81 
More recently, just before the FERA amendments, the Fourth Circuit held in 
United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC that a false claim made 
to a grantee of government funding is a “claim” under § 3729(c), “so long as 
‘any portion’ of the claim is or will be funded by U.S. money given to the 
grantee.”82  The Fourth Circuit’s holding foreshadowed the FERA 
amendments by expanding the term “claim” to encompass false claims for 
property—regardless of whether the government had control of the property.83 
D.  The Private-Citizen Enforcement Mechanism 
The FCA permits private citizens to bring lawsuits on behalf of the United 
States (qui tam lawsuits) on a contingency-fee basis.84  This enforcement 
                                                 
 74. BOESE, supra note 15, § 2.02[B], at 2-88 to 2-89. 
 75. FCAA, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 2, 100 Stat. 3153, 3153–54 (1986) (codified as amended 
at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2006)). 
For purposes of this section, “claim” includes any request or demand, whether under a 
contract or otherwise, for money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or 
other recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of the money or 
property which is requested or demanded, or if the Government will reimburse such 
contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money or property which is 
requested or demanded. 
Id. 
 76. Id. § 2, 100 Stat. at 3154. 
 77. See BOESE, supra note 15, § 2.02[B][1]-[3], at 2-88 to 2-92. 
 78. United States ex rel. Schwedt v. Planning Research Corp., 59 F.3d 196, 199 (D.C. Cir. 
1995). 
 79. Lamb Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 106, 111–12 (Fed. Cl. 2003). 
 80. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 
1017, 1046 (S.D. Tex. 1998). 
 81. United States ex rel. Main v. Oakland City Univ., 426 F.3d 914, 916–17 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 82. 562 F.3d 295, 303 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2006)). 
 83. Id. at 303–04. 
 84. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2006) (“A person may bring a civil action for a violation 
of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government.  The action shall be brought 
in the name of the Government.  The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney 
General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.”); Beck, supra 
note 22, at 541 (describing the mechanics of a qui tam statute). 
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model is important because it provides private parties with standing to sue, 
regardless of whether the private litigant suffered any harm.85   
Qui tam actions arise when private parties—relators—receive the statutory 
right to sue for damages in place of the U.S. government.86  When such suits 
are successful, the relator and the government divide the proceeds according to 
the statute.87 
Although Congress provided qui tam provisions in the first iteration of the 
FCA, private plaintiffs were uncommon until after the 1986 amendments.88  
These amendments helped encourage qui tam litigation, as Congress 
intended.89  The amended provisions guaranteed relators repayment of 
expenses and attorneys’ fees, plus up to thirty percent of the government’s 
recovery.90  Furthermore, the government’s preexisting knowledge of the 
alleged fraud underlying the relator’s lawsuit could no longer provide a 
jurisdictional bar, unless the information had been publicly disclosed and the 
relator was not an original source of the information forming the suit’s basis.91  
The 1986 amendments also provided protection for individuals who assisted in 
bringing the qui tam lawsuit by creating a cause of action for victims of 
employer retaliation.92 
                                                 
 85. See Beck, supra note 22, at 543–44.  The impact of the qui tam model is illustrated by 
FCA statistics: of 712 new FCA matters in 2010, only 138 were not qui tam suits, compared to 
574 qui tam actions.  Fraud Statistics-Overview, supra note 16.  As one enthusiastic 
congressional supporter of the FCA queried, “What harm can there be if 10,000 lawyers in 
America are assisting the Attorney General of the United States in digging up war frauds?” 
BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.02, at 1–15 (quoting 89 CONG. REC. S7606 (1943) (statement of Sen. 
Langer)). 
 86. “Qui tam” is part of the Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac 
parte sequitur” meaning “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009). 
 87. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2006). 
 88. See BOESE, supra note 15, at 1-6. 
 89. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 23–24 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5288–89. 
 90. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2).  The relator receives a smaller award when the suit is 
based primarily on publicly disclosed information or when the relator plans and initiates the 
conduct giving rise to the claim.  See id. § 3730(d)(1), (3). 
 91. See id. § 3730(e)(4). 
 92. FCAA, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 4, 100 Stat. 3153, 3157–58 (1986) (codified as amended 
at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)). 
Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any 
other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by his or 
her employer because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee or 
others in furtherance of an action under this section, including investigation for, initiation 
of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be filed under this section, shall be 
entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole.  Such relief shall include 
reinstatement with the same seniority status such employee would have had but for the 
discrimination, 2 times the amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and 
compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, 
including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.   An employee may bring an 
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The strengthened qui tam provisions not only helped the Department of 
Justice prosecute fraud,93 but also created a new cause of action by eliminating 
prior government knowledge as a defense.94  The government extended the 
reach of the FCA through the qui tam model because relators were more likely 
than the government to pursue alleged frauds based on technical violations that 
did not damage the public purse.95 
E. Penalties and Damages Under the FCA 
The 1986 amendments also increased the penalties for violating the FCA.96  
Previously, the 1863 FCA levied penalties of $2000 for each false claim 
submitted, in addition to twice the government’s losses.97  The 1986 
amendments increased the available damages to three times the government’s 
losses, as well as $5000 to $10,000 per false claim.98  Because civil penalties 
                                                                                                                 
action in the appropriate district court of the United States for the relief provided in this 
subsection. 
Id. 
 93. The increasing number of qui tam cases illustrates the effectiveness of the  
private-citizen enforcement model.  In 1987, qui tam relators filed thirty cases in federal district 
courts.  Fraud Statistics-Overview, supra note 16.  In 2010, by comparison, relators filed 574 
claims, bringing the total number of qui tam cases filed by the end of 2010 to over 7000.  Id. 
 94. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 948 (1997). 
 95. Id. at 949 
 96. FCAA, § 2, 100 Stat. at 3153 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)).  Under the 
more stringent statutory provisions: 
[A person] is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than 
$5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the 
Government sustains because of the act of that person, except that if the court finds 
that– 
(A) the person committing the violation of this subsection furnished officials of the 
United States responsible for investigating false claims violations with all 
information known to such person about the violation within 30 days after the date 
on which the defendant first obtained the information; 
(B) such person fully cooperated with any Government investigation of such 
violation; and 
(C) at the time such person furnished the United States with the information about the 
violation, no criminal prosecution, civil action, or administrative action had commenced 
under this title with respect to such violation, and the person did not have actual 
knowledge of the existence of an investigation into such violation;  
the court may assess not less than 2 times the amount of damages which the 
Government sustains because of the act of the person. A person violating this 
subsection shall also be liable to the United States Government for the costs of a civil 
action brought to recover any such penalty or damages. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273.  The 1863 
equivalent of $2,000 would have been more than $18,000 in 1986.  132 CONG. REC. 22,335 
(1986) (statement of Rep. Daniel Glickman). 
 98. FCAA, § 2, 100 Stat. at 3153.. 
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must be adjusted for inflation, the penalties have since increased to a minimum 
of $5500 and a maximum of $11,000.99 
Although the FCA provides for reduced damages in voluntary-disclosure 
cases,100 no court has yet applied them.101  FCA penalties appear to be 
mandatory on the statute’s face,102 and when courts have imposed damages, 
they have awarded treble damages.103  Notwithstanding the language of the 
statute, deciding the claims to which penalties apply provides leeway to courts 
when imposing penalties.104 
The government can also recover penalties and damages from the defendant 
for the costs of the civil action.105  Moreover, § 3730(d) provides that qui tam 
plaintiffs can recoup expenses and “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs” from 
the defendant.106 
F.  The Presentment Requirement and Allison Engine Company v. United 
States ex rel. Sanders 
 In Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, former employees of 
General Tool Company (GTC) brought suit, alleging that invoices submitted to 
naval shipyards by subcontractors Allison Engine Company, GTC, and 
Southern Ohio Fabricators (SOFCO), were fraudulent.107  The claims asserted 
that the relators work on the generator sets had not been completed in 
accordance with the Navy’s specifications, and the three subcontractors issued 
false certifications declaring that the work had been done properly.108  The 
former employees sought to recover damages under three FCA sections:  
§ 3729(a)(1), which concerns direct presentment of a false claim to the 
government; § 3729(a)(2), which creates liability for using a false record or 
                                                 
 99. 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a) (2010). 
 100. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (Supp. III 2009). 
 101. BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.04[E], at 1-23 to 1-24. 
 102. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G); BOESE, supra note 15, §3.05[B], at 3-94. 
 103. BOESE, supra note 15, § 1.04[E], at 1-23 to 1-24; see, e.g., United States v. Mackby, 
339 F.3d 1013, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming the imposition of treble damages and 
penalties). 
 104. BOESE, supra note 15, § 3.05[B], at 3-94. 
 105. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3) (Supp. III 2009). 
 106. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2006). 
 107. 553 U.S. 662, 665–66 (2008), superseded by statute, FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21. 123 
Stat. 1617 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.).  The United 
States Navy contracted with two shipyards, Bath Iron Works and Ingalls Shipbuilding, to build a 
new fleet of over fifty guided missile destroyers. Id.  The shipyards in turn contracted with 
Allison Engine Company to build ninety generator sets for the destroyers, and Allison Engine 
Company contracted with GTC to assemble the generator sets.  Id.  GTC then subcontracted with 
SOFCO to manufacture parts of the generator sets. Id. at 666.  Each subcontractor—Allison 
Engine Company, GTC, and SOFCO—entered into an agreement that required the parties to build 
ship parts to meet the Navy’s standards. Id.  The contracts also required that a “certification of 
conformance” be delivered with each generator. Id. 
 108. Id. at 666–67. 
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statement to get a claim paid or approved; and § 3729(a)(3), which prohibits 
conspiring to defraud the Government.109  At trial, the relators did not 
introduce evidence that the shipyards submitted false claims to the Navy; 
rather, they showed that false statements had been presented by the three 
subcontractors to the shipyards.110 
A divided Sixth Circuit panel held that liability could attach under 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a)(2) and (3) without the presentment of a false claim to the 
government.111  “The FCA,” the majority explained, “covers all claims to 
government money, even if the claimant does not have a direct connection to 
the government.”112  The court’s holding created a circuit split, as the Sixth 
Circuit disagreed with the D.C. Circuit’s Totten decision, in which the court 
had held that the presentment clause applied to both § 3729(a)(1) and (2).113 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and agreed with the Sixth Circuit that 
§ 3729(a)(2) had no presentment requirement.114  In the unanimous decision, 
however, the Court overturned the Sixth Circuit’s holding that liability under  
§ 3729(a)(2) attached merely because a contractor paid a subcontractor’s false 
claim using government funds.115  The Court noted that the statutory language 
created liability when a defendant submitted a false record or statement “to 
get” a claim “paid or approved by the government.”116  The Court interpreted 
“to get” as an indication that the defendant must intend for the government to 
pay the false claim, and not merely for a private third party to pay the claim 
using government funds.117   
Although the Court rejected the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the 
presentment requirement in § 3729(a)(2),118 it expressed concerns over an 
unchecked FCA.119  Without intent to defraud the government, the Court 
stated, the “direct link” between a subcontractor’s false statement and the 
                                                 
 109. Id. at 666. 
 110. Id. at 667. 
 111. United States ex rel. Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., 471 F.3d 610, 615–16 (6th Cir. 
2006), rev’d on other grounds, 533 U.S. 662 (2008), and superseded by statute, FERA, Pub. L. 
No. 111-21, 123 Stat. at 1617–31. 
 112. Id. at 618. 
 113. United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
See supra Part I.B. for an in-depth discussion of Totten. 
 114. Allison Engine, 553 U.S. at 671. 
 115. Id. at 665. 
 116. Id. at 668–69 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 117. Id.  Similarly, for liability under § 3729(a)(3), a plaintiff  “must show that the 
conspirators agreed to make use of the false record or statement to achieve this end.”  Id. at 665. 
 118. Id. at 671. 
 119. Id. at 669 (stating that a broad interpretation of the statute would allow liability to 
“attach for any false claim  made to any college or university . . . [that] received some federal 
grants” (quoting United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 496 (D.C. Cir. 
2004))). 
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government’s decision to pay a false claim was too attenuated to prove 
liability.120  This broader interpretation, the Court observed, “would expand the 
FCA well beyond its intended role” and result in a statute whose reach was 
“almost boundless.”121   
G.  FERA and the 2009 Amendments 
In May 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009,122 which expanded liability under the 
FCA.123  By passing the FERA, Congress singled out the Allison Engine and 
Totten decisions as incorrect interpretations of the FCA.124 
1.  The “Presentment Clause” and Intent to Defraud the Government  
Before the FERA amendments, liability did not attach under § 3729(a)(1) 
unless a defendant presented a false claim for payment or approval to an 
“employee of the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces 
of the United States.”125  The 2009 amendments changed this requirement; 
now, the false claim for compensation or approval can be presented to anyone 
for payment, as long as the federal government has or will provide part of the 
money to pay the claim.126 
The amendments also removed language from § 3729(a)(1)(B) that the 
Supreme Court relied on in Allison Engine to hold that a defendant must intend 
for his false claim or statement to be material to the government’s decision to 
pay or approve the claim.127  FERA also removed similar language from  
§ 3729(a)(1)(C) and (G).128  
                                                 
 120. Id. at 672 (“Recognizing a cause of action under the FCA for fraud directed at private 
entities would threaten to transform the FCA into an all-purpose antifraud statute.”). 
 121. Id. at 669 (quoting Totten, 380 F.2d at 496) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 122. FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.). 
 123. Congress renumbered and modified all seven liability provisions of the FCA.  Compare 
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)–(7) (2006), with 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G) (Supp. III 2009). 
 124. S. REP. NO. 110-21, at 10 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438.  From 
Congress’s perspective, “[t]he effectiveness of the FCA ha[d] been recently undermined by court 
decisions limiting the scope of the law and allowing subcontractors and non-governmental 
entities to escape responsibility for proven frauds.”  Id. at 10, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 437.  The 
FERA amendments were a correction and clarification of these judicial interpretations so as to 
protect “the Federal assistance and relief funds expended in response to our current economic 
crisis.”  Id. at 4, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 433. 
 125. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006). 
 126. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (Supp. III 2009). 
 127. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (Supp. III 2009), with id.  § 3729(a)(2) (2006); see 
Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 665 (2008), superseded by 
statute, FERA, 123 Stat. at 1617–31. 
 128. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(C), (G) (Supp. III 2009). 
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Congress stated that it intended the amendments to uphold the FCA’s 
original purpose, and that the amendments targeted subcontractors who 
knowingly submitted false claims to general contractors for payment in 
government money.129  Congress did not specify whether liability attaches to a 
subcontractor who knowingly submits a false claim to another subcontractor 
and is paid with government funds.130 
2.  “Claim” Redefined 
Under the new definition of “claim”,131 a false claim to any recipient of 
government money triggers liability if the money is intended for “the 
Government’s [use] or to advance a Government program or interest.”132  This 
phrase was not explained by the amendments and remains for courts to 
define.133 
3. New Qui Tam Protections 
The FERA amendments notably widened protections for relators.134  Before 
FERA, § 3730(h) only protected employees from retaliation by their 
employers.135  Now, § 3730(h)(1) extends protection to contractors and 
agents.136  
Perhaps the most significant change to the whistle-blower protections is the 
removal of statutory language that required retaliatory actions from the 
                                                 
 129. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10–11 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438. 
 130. Id. 
 131. As defined in the most recent version of the United States Code, the term “claim”: 
(A) means any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for 
money or property and whether or not the United States has title to the money or 
property, that— 
   (i) is presented to an officer, employee, or agent of the United States; or 
(ii) is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient, if the money or property is 
to be spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a Government 
program or interest, and if the United States Government— 
(I) provides or has provided any portion of the money or property 
requested or demanded; or 
(II) will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any 
portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded; and 
(B) does not include requests or demands for money or property that the 
Government has paid to an individual as compensation for Federal employment or 
as an income subsidy with no restrictions on that individual’s use of the money or 
property[.] 
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2010) (emphasis added). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See infra notes 136–39 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 136. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1)–(2) (Supp. III 2009). 
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employer.137  The statute, which previously provided a cause of action only 
when the employer discriminated against the whistle-blowing employee,138 
extended the bases of employer mistreatment that would give rise to a suit.139 
H.  The Mail-Fraud Statute and Vagueness Concerns 
Congressional reactions to similar amendments to the mail-fraud statute140 
provide an example of the dangers of vagueness and overbreadth.141  First 
enacted in 1872—only nine years after the first FCA—the statute has often 
been wielded by federal prosecutors142 in conjunction with the newer  
wire-fraud statute.143  Described as the government’s primary weapon in the 
                                                 
 137. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006), with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1) (Supp. III 2009). 
 138. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006). 
 139. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1) (Supp. III 2009). 
 140. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. III 2009).  The mail-fraud statute provides: 
     Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or 
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, 
distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious 
coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or 
held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such 
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized 
depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the 
Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be 
sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives 
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or 
such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to 
be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.  If the violation 
occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted, 
transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with, a presidentially declared major 
disaster or emergency (as those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a 
financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned 
not more than 30 years, or both. 
Id. 
 141. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2935–41 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(stating that the honest-services statute was too vague to be saved by the Court’s interpretation); 
Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1308–11 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“If the ‘honest 
services’ theory . . . is taken seriously and carried to its logical conclusion, presumably the statute 
also renders criminal a state legislator’s decision to vote for a bill because he expects it will curry 
favor with a small minority essential to his reelection; a mayor’s attempt to use the prestige of his 
office to obtain a restaurant table without a reservation; a public employee’s recommendation of 
his incompetent friend for a public contract; and any self-dealing by a corporate officer.”). 
 142. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Section 
1341 of Title 18 U.S.C. has traditionally been used against fraudulent activity as a first line of 
defense.  When a ‘new’ fraud develops—as constantly happens—the mail fraud statute becomes a 
stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon, until particularized 
legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly with the evil.”). 
 143. See supra note 9. 
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fight against crime,144 prosecutors have used § 1341 and § 1343 as “catch-all” 
statutes.145  Between them, these statues cover issues ranging from mailing 
fraudulent prize-giveaway schemes,146 to sport-association rule violations147 
and citizens’ rights to honest and fair government protection.148  
The Supreme Court temporarily halted the expansion of liability under the 
mail-fraud statute in McNally v. United States in 1987.149  In McNally, the 
Court held that “[t]he mail fraud statute clearly protects property rights, but 
does not refer to the intangible right of the citizenry to good government.”150  
The Court interpreted the original purpose of the statute as protecting only 
people’s money or property.151  
Congress immediately responded to the McNally decision by enacting the 
“honest services” statute—§ 1346—in 1988.152  This section defined the term 
“scheme or artifice to defraud,” as “a scheme or artifice to deprive another of 
the intangible right of honest services.”153  Through this language, the 
amendment specifically covered “the intangible right to honest services” 
protected by the lower courts.154  
                                                 
 144. Brian C. Behrens, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1346: Deciphering the Confusing Letters of 
the Mail Fraud Statute, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 489, 491 (1993). 
 145. Id. at 498. 
 146. Id. 
 147. United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1221–22 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 148. Behrens, supra note 144, at 498.  One former prosecutor went so far as to describe the 
mail-fraud statute as “our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart—and 
our true love.  We may flirt with RICO, show off with 10b-5, and call the conspiracy law 
‘darling,’ but we always come home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, with its simplicity, 
adaptability, and comfortable familiarity.”  Rakoff, supra note 9, at 771 (internal citations 
omitted). 
 149. 483 U.S. 350, 361 (1987), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100–690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)). 
 150. Id. at 356. Through its reasoning, the Court made clear: 
[When] there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, 
we are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite 
language. . . . Rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer 
boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of 
disclosure and good government for local and state officials, we read § 1341 as limited 
in scope to the protection of property rights.  If Congress desires to go further, it must 
speak more clearly than it has. 
Id. at 359–60. 
 151. Id. at 356. 
 152. Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 7603, 102 Stat. at 4508.  As with previous mail-fraud 
amendments, the legislative history of § 1346 is quite limited.  From the timing of the amendment 
and the pre-enactment debates, though, it is clear that the amendment was largely intended to 
overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in McNally.  See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. 32,727, 33,297 
(1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (“This amendment restores the mail fraud provision to where 
that provision was before the McNally decision.”). 
 153. Anti-Drug Abuse Act § 7603, 102 Stat. at 4508. 
 154. See Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 19–20 (2000). Academics have heavily 
criticized the intangible-rights doctrine.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. The Metastasis of Mail 
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In 2010, the Supreme Court discussed the matter of honest-services fraud for 
the first time since its 1987 McNally decision.155  Writing for the Court in 
Skilling v. United States, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg limited the application 
of § 1346 to bribery and kickback schemes—the core pre-McNally honest 
services offenses.156  A broader reading of the statute, the Court argued, could 
“render the statute impermissibly vague.”157   
In a concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the  
honest-services statute was void for vagueness, as it failed to provide fair 
notice and encouraged arbitrary discrimination.158  He stated that the Court 
should not dabble in statutory construction, but instead reverse the § 1346 
conviction because the statute “fail[ed] to define the conduct it prohibits.”159  
In both McNally and Skilling, the Court applied the doctrine of lenity to 
resolve ambiguities in the mail-fraud statute.160  That doctrine accounts for 
                                                                                                                 
Fraud: The Continuing Story of the “Evolution” of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1, 3 (1983) (arguing for statutory reform); Ezersky, supra note 9, at 1427 (contending that the 
statute harms its supposed beneficiaries and offends principles of federalism); Daniel J. Hurson, 
Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute—A Legislative Approach, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 423, 
424–26 (1983) (advocating for a redrafted statute with “a precise definition of a ‘scheme to 
defraud’”); Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43 S.C. L. REV. 223, 225 (1992) 
(arguing for a legislative amendment of the statute and strict judicial interpretation to curb the 
wide applicability of the statute); Gregory Howard Williams, Good Government by Prosecutorial 
Decree: The Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 137, 168–70 (1990) (cautioning 
against the use of the honest-services statute without guidelines to direct its application); W. 
Robert Gray, Comment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political-Corruption Prosecutions 
Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 562, 562–63 (1980) (questioning the 
use of the intangible-rights doctrine in political corruption cases). 
 155. See generally Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).  Over the two decades 
before it accepted certiorari in Skilling, the Court had various opportunities to construe the statute, 
but it turned down these requests.  Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate 
Fiduciary Duties Through Criminal Prosecution of Honest Services Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 
4 (2010); see also Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1308 (2009) (denying certiorari). 
 156. 130 S. Ct. at 2928.  The Court focused on the congressional intent in enacting  
§ 1346, concluding that Congress “meant to reinstate the body of pre-McNally honest-services 
law.”  Id. at 2929.  Surveying the pre-McNally case law, the Court observed that although the 
Court of Appeals had disagreed over the honest-services doctrine, the core of cases “involved 
offenders who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participated in bribery or kickback schemes.”  Id. 
at 2930.  Therefore, the Court reasoned, Congress must have “intended § 1346 to reach at least 
bribes and kickbacks.”  Id. at 2931. 
 157. Id. at 2931 n.42. 
 158. Id. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 159. Id. at 2940. 
 160. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933 (“Holding that honest-services fraud does not encompass 
conduct more wide-ranging than the paradigmatic cases of bribes and kickbacks, we resist the 
Government’s less constrained construction absent Congress’ clear instruction otherwise.”); 
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (“Rather than construe the statute in a 
manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in 
setting standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials, we read § 
1341 as limited in scope to the protection of property rights.”), superseded by statute, Anti-Drug 
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ambiguities in criminal statutes by narrowly construing the offending 
language161 to provide citizens with fair notice of punishable conduct.162  As in 
Skilling, courts use lenity to avoid invalidating a statute.163   
II.  THE DANGER OF AN OVERBROAD FCA 
Since Congress attempted to clarify the FCA in 2009,164 potential liability 
under the FCA is broader than ever before.165  Previously, legislative history 
accompanying the amendments targeted subcontractors who knowingly 
submitted a false claim to a general government contractor;166 however, the 
new world of liability created by the amendments does not stop with that 
subcontractor.167  Instead, any person—including a subcontractor—who 
knowingly submits a false claim for payment to a private entity, or uses a false 
statement that is material to a false claim, may be liable under the Act.168  
Furthermore, liability no longer hinges on whether the government has title to 
the money for which the claim is being paid.169  The statute only requires that 
(1) at some point, the government provided the money to pay the claim or will 
reimburse the money, and (2) the money was spent to advance a government 
interest or program.170  Under the statute’s broad scope, the fungibility of 
money will create a long chain of liability under the FCA.171  
                                                                                                                 
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 1346). 
 161. See McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 657–58 (1982). The Supreme Court has 
also used lenity in civil contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 
505, 517–18 (1992) (applying the rule of lenity to a tax statute that the Court construed in a civil 
setting, but which also had criminal applications); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 
(1990) (stating that where a standard in a civil statute is “set forth in a criminal statute, it is 
appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute’s 
coverage”). 
 162. McNally, 483 U.S. at 375 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 163. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct at 2907. 
 164. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 4 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 433 (“The False 
Claims Act must be corrected and clarified in order to protect from fraud the Federal assistance 
and relief funds expended in response to our current economic crisis.”). 
 165. See infra Part II.A. 
 166. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 438. 
 167. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B), (b)(2) (Supp. III 2009) (providing no internal limits 
to liability); S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10, reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 438 (noting that 
limitation of the FCA’s scope has curbed the statute’s effectiveness). 
 168. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B), (b)(2). 
 169. Id. § 3729(b)(2). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See infra Part II.A. 
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A.  Effect of Amendments 
The Supreme Court’s fears regarding consequences of the relator’s 
arguments in Allison Engine have been fully realized.172  In oral arguments for 
Allison Engine, Chief Justice Roberts outlined the Supreme Court’s concerns 
over an expanded FCA in a short hypothetical:  
The government gives money to the State to build a school.  The 
school has to be painted as part of that, so the school contractor, the 
prime contractor, takes some of the money from the Federal 
Government and pays the painter.  The painter needs to buy paint.  
So the painter takes some of the Federal money and pays the paint 
company.  The paint company has to get the chemicals from 
somebody.  So the paint company takes some of the money and pays 
the chemical company.  And at that point, the chemical companies 
fraudulently added, you know, a dollar on to the cost of the 
chemicals.  So that dollar goes all the way through.  So the 
Government ends up paying a dollar more because of the fraud five, 
six, seven times down the line.173 
The Chief Justice then asked whether a relator could bring an FCA suit against 
the chemical company in this scenario; the Assistant to the Solicitor General 
responded with a qualified “yes.”174 
Chief Justice Roberts’s hypothetical is not unrealistic.175  In Allison Engine, 
the relators sued three tiers of subcontractors out of hundreds that constructed 
the warships.176  If a third-tier subcontractor can be held liable under the FCA, 
then a sixth-, seventh-, or eighth-tier subcontractor can also be liable—the 
current FCA contains no clear internal limits to liability.177 
                                                 
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 118–21. 
 173. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 33. 
 174. Id. 
 175. The plain language of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 provides no obvious limits to liability, except 
subsection (b)(2)’s requirement that the money at issue is “used on the Government’s behalf or to 
advance a Government program or interest.”  See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2). 
 176. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 
553 U.S. 662 (2008), superseded by statute, FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.) (No. 07-214). 
 177. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1); supra text accompanying note 126.  FCA liability comes 
with a price.  Although calculating damages and penalties can become complex, their significance 
is easily grasped.  See BOESE, supra note 15, § 3.01 for a detailed discussion of the application of 
the FCA’s penalty and damage provisions.  A Department of Justice attorney illustrated how 
quickly damages and penalties can accrue: 
Triple damages are substantial enough; but couple that with the  $5,000–$10,000 in 
penalties for each request . . . for reimbursement, and the government’s potential 
damages mount very quickly.  The math is easy to do: for every 100 false claims  
a . . . provider submits, it can face liability for $1 million in penalties alone. 
BOESE, supra note 15, at 1-15 (footnote omitted) (quoting Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney 
Gen., Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address of the Annual Meeting of the A.B.A., Public 
Contracts Section: Increasing Criminalization of Health Care (Aug. 11, 1991). 
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B.  The FCA is Overbroad, Vague, and Punitive 
By expansively defining “claim” and eliminating any presentment 
requirement, Congress created a statute with almost limitless reach.178  The 
FCA now effectively transforms garden-variety fraud into fraud against the 
government, thus betraying the statute’s intended purpose of protecting the 
Department of Treasury from fraudulent claims for government money or 
property.179  
The lack of clear limits in the FCA raises questions of overbreadth and 
vagueness.180  Vagueness voids a statute when its prohibitions are  
                                                                                                                 
     To illustrate the potential reach of the new FCA through its damages and penalties provisions, 
consider the following scenario: A small sixth-tier defense subcontractor knowingly submitted a 
false claim for payment to a fifth-tier defense subcontractor as part of a private contract in which 
the sixth-tier subcontractor provided machine-cleaning widgets.  If any part of the sixth-tier 
subcontractor’s false claim is paid or will be paid with money that was once released by the 
Federal Treasury, and those widgets will be used to ultimately “advance a government interest or 
program,” then the sixth-tier subcontractor is liable under the FCA. 
     To take the example further, imagine the sixth-tier subcontractor manufactured machine-
cleaning widgets that the fifth-tier subcontractor purchased to clean its shop-floor machinery.  
Those widgets in turn are used to create components for a fourth-tier subcontractor.  A general 
government contractor eventually uses these components in some product for the U.S. Army.  
The sixth-tier subcontractor does not realize, however, that its widgets are used to create a 
product for the U.S. Army.  Over a five-year contract with the fifth-tier contractor, the sixth-tier 
subcontractor provided 540 widgets, at a true value of $200 each.  However, in it its biweekly 
invoice, the sixth-tier subcontractor overcharged the fifth-tier subcontractor by $50 for each 
widget.  This amounts to an overbilling by $27,000 and the submission of 130 false claims for 
payment. 
     Under § 3729(a)(1)(G), there is a penalty of $5000 to $11,000 for each of these false claims, 
plus triple the amount of damages suffered by the government.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1).  Even 
without any actual harm to the government, the sixth-tier subcontractor is potentially liable for 
$1.43 million in penalties.  If the government suffers financial harm, then the sixth-tier 
subcontractor may have to pay an additional $81,000 in damages. Furthermore, the sixth-tier 
subcontractor’s government contracting license may be revoked. 
     Before the most recent FCA amendments, the sixth-tier subcontractor would not be liable 
under § 3729(a)(1)(A), as it did not directly present its false claims to the government.  See  
§ 3729(a)(1)(A) (2006).  Under Allison Engine, the sixth-tier subcontractor would also not be 
liable under § 3729(a)(1)(B) because it had no intent to defraud the government.  See Allison 
Engine, 553 U.S. at 671–73. 
 178. See supra Part I.G.1–2. 
 179. See supra notes 43–50 and accompanying text. 
 180. One commentator considers vagueness and overbreadth to be indistinguishable.  See A. 
G. A., Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67,  
75–85 (1960).  Indeed, the Supreme Court often speaks of the doctrines together.  See, e.g., 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358–59, 358 n.8 (1983) (“[W]e have traditionally viewed 
vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar doctrines.”); Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967) (“Where statutes have an overbroad sweep, just as where they 
are vague . . . those covered by the statute are bound to limit their behavior . . . .” (internal 
citations omitted)); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963) (“The objectionable quality 
of vagueness and overbreadth . . . [depends] . . . upon the danger of tolerating . . . the existence of 
a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application.” (footnote omitted)). Even if 
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unclear.181  Instead, laws must have sufficient clarity to provide “the person of 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.”182  
This certainty prevents arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law.183  
These standards, however, are applied less strictly to civil enactments than to 
criminal statutes, and a scienter requirement may “mitigate [the] law’s 
vagueness.”184 
Here, the FCA presents a fair-notice problem.  Although the chemical 
company in Chief Justices Robert’s hypothetical knowingly defrauded the 
paint manufacturer, the chemical company was likely unaware that its actions 
also defrauded the government under the FCA.185  As Justice Samuel Alito, Jr. 
stated in the Allison Engine opinion: 
In such a situation, the direct link between the false statement and the 
Government’s decision to pay or approve a false claim is too 
attenuated to establish liability. Recognizing a cause of action under 
the FCA for fraud directed at private entities would threaten to 
transform the FCA into an all-purpose antifraud statute.186 
Although fair-notice requirements are less stringent because the FCA is a 
civil statute, the FCA’s punitive characteristics and unique qui tam 
enforcement mechanism suggest it should be treated more like a criminal 
statute, similar to the mail-fraud statute.187  Therefore, the severity of the civil 
punishment meted out under the FCA indicates that the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine applies.188  
                                                                                                                 
vagueness and overbreadth are treated separately, and one successfully argues that the FCA’s 
language is not vague, the statute is still astoundingly overbroad.  See generally supra Part II.A; 
see also supra note 173 (describing the FCA’s overbreadth). 
 181. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (“Vague laws offend several 
important values.  First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful 
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.  Vague laws may trap the innocent by 
not providing fair warning.  Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be 
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them.  A vague law 
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an 
ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
application.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 182. Id. at 108. 
 183. See id. at 108–09. 
 184. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 
(1982). 
 185. See Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008), 
superseded by statute, FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.). 
 186. Id. 
 187. See infra Part II.B. 
 188. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) (stating that the severity of 
deportation as a punishment is cause to consider the void-for-vagueness doctrine in a civil 
context). 
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Legislative blurring of criminal and civil statutes has not gone unnoticed.189  
Although courts and Congress have interpreted the FCA as a remedial 
statute,190 one commentator argued that when a “statutory scheme [is] so 
punitive” one questions whether the legislature “negate[d] that intention.”191  
The Supreme Court has treated civil fines and criminal fines similarly when 
considering possible violations of the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits 
excessive fines.192  The Court has stated that “a civil sanction that cannot fairly 
be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as 
also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have 
come to understand the term.”193  Furthermore, in United States v. Bornstein, 
the Court recognized the partly punitive nature of the FCA194—a view echoed 
by lower courts.195  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that although the FCA 
does not specify whether its penalties are punitive or remedial, the “sanction 
clearly has a punitive purpose.”196  
The FCA’s treble damages further advance its punitive nature.197  In Cook 
County, Illinois v. United States ex rel. Chandler, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged the dual remedial and punitive nature of the treble damages 
provision.198  Moreover, the Court held that treble damages imposed by other  
                                                 
 189. See generally Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve 
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 
42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991) (harmonizing criminal and civil statutes). 
 190. See supra Part I.A.1–4. (discussing the FCA’s purpose); see also infra Part II.B. 
(analyzing the punitive and remedial nature of FCA). 
 191. David S. Rudstein, Civil Penalties and Multiple Punishment Under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause: Some Unanswered Questions, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 587, 591 (1993) (quoting United States 
v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362–63 (1984)). 
 192. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997) (“The Eighth Amendment protects 
against excessive civil fines . . . .”).  A fine is unconstitutionally excessive if the payment to the 
government constitutes punishment for an indiscretion, and the payment “is grossly 
disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.”  United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 
321, 327–28, 334 (1998). 
 193. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989). 
 194. 423 U.S. 303, 309–10, 309 n.5 (1976) (“According to its sponsor, the False Claims Act 
was adopted ‘for the purpose of punishing and preventing . . . frauds.’” (citations omitted)). 
 195. See, e.g., United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 196. Id. 
 197. As one commentator explained, “The penalty provisions are intended to deter fraudulent 
conduct, especially when actual damages would be nominal. Where actual damages are not 
nominal, the trebling of those damages deters as well as compensates, with the result that the 
deterrence is multiplied without any consideration of the impact of such multiplied  
deterrence . . . .”  The False Claims Amendments Act of 1993: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts and Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 62 (1993) (statement 
of Rand L. Allen, U.S. Chamber of Commerce). 
 198. 538 U.S. 119, 130 (2003).  The assessment of both the penalty and treble damages are 
automatic.  See United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1533–34 (11th Cir. 1988).  
Consequential damages and pre-judgment interest, however, are not recoverable under the Act. 
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statutes were also partly punitive.199 
Although defendants liable under the FCA clearly do not face the harsh jail 
sentences meted out to defendants convicted under §§ 1341 and 1343,200 the 
lack of a requirement that the government show damages makes the FCA seem 
punitive rather than remedial, especially in conjunction with the penalties, 
treble damages, and costs provisions.201  Moreover, a government contractor 
might be barred from future government contracting if it is found to have 
violated the FCA.202  If a contractor commits fraud, it must also contend with 
the associated stigma, regardless of whether it was consequently disbarred. 203  
This loss of reputation alone can severely limit future contracting 
opportunities.204 
Furthermore, considering the FCA’s scienter requirements reemphasizes the 
punitive nature of the statute.  Section 3729 requires no showing of specific 
intent to defraud.205  Instead, “deliberate ignorance of the truth” or “reckless 
disregard of the truth” satisfies the intent element.206  In contrast, under the 
mail and wire-fraud statutes, the government has to prove beyond a reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
See Cook County, 538 U.S. at 131; United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1011 (5th Cir. 
1972).  
 199. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 
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States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding the FCA’s penalty violates the Double Jeopardy 
Clause).  Halper, a manager of a New York medical laboratory, routinely overcharged the 
government by overbilling Medicare for patient treatment.  Id.  He was convicted of sixty-five 
falsely submitted claims, inflated by a maximum of $9 for each submission, totaling $585.  Id. at 
532–33.  The Government, however, sought $130,000 in penalties under the FCA.  Id. at 533.  
Under the increased penalties of the 1986 amendments, his fine would have increased to between 
$325,000 and $650,000.  See BOESE, supra note 15, § 3.06[A], at 3-109 n.463.  For his criminal 
conviction under the FCA, he received two years in jail.  Halper, 660 F. Supp. at 532. 
 202. See, e.g., Stacy & Witbeck, Inc. v. City and County of S.F., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 472, 475 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding the right of the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission to 
disbar a public-works contractor from bidding on projects for five years, after the Commission 
determined the contractor had filed a false claim and had acted irresponsibly). 
 203. Frank LaSalle, Comment, The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened 
Burden of Proof as a Prerequisite for Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L. REV. 497, 522–23 (1995). 
 204. Id. at 523–25. 
 205. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(B) (Supp. III 2009).  To continue the example in note 177, 
supra,—if a sixth-tier subcontractor submits false claims to a fifth-tier subcontractor with a 
reckless disregard of the truth but no intent to defraud the government, the sixth-tier subcontractor 
could be fined $1.43 million dollars for defrauding the government.  See supra note 177. 
 206. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii). 
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doubt207 that the defendant knowingly made false representations or that the 
scheme was “reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence 
and comprehension.”208 
In light of the FCA’s punitive nature, Congress and the courts must take the 
statute’s overbreadth concerns seriously.  The FCA deserves to be treated as a 
quasi-criminal statute because of the severity of its damages and forfeitures. 
C.  Strain on Judicial Resources 
Even if the FERA amendments are not unconstitutionally overbroad, the 
potential strain on the federal court system could be immense.  The extended 
reach of the FCA, coupled with the greater protection afforded to qui tam 
relators,209 has created a situation ripe for the proliferation of qui tam suits.210  
Already, the FCA is “the fastest growing area of federal litigation.”211  At 
the outset of 2011, the Department of Justice had over 1300 qui tam cases 
awaiting review.212  In the first quarter of 2011, there were thirty-nine newly 
filed FCA cases.213   
The number of cases is likely to grow as qui tam relators begin to appreciate 
both the new opportunities to bring FCA suits and the increase in federal 
budgets for enforcement actions.214  The government’s 2011 budget proposal 
requested a $234.6 million increase from 2010 to be used in the Department of 
Justice’s fight against fraud.215  This includes an additional 708  
                                                 
 207. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is required to establish guilt for any criminal charge). 
 208. United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cir. 1978); see also Kehr Packages, 
Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1415 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 209. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (Supp. III 2009). 
 210. See infra text accompanying notes 213–16. 
 211. Program Guide, Am. Bar. Assoc., The Eighth Annual National Institute on the Civil 
False Claims Act and Qui Tam Enforcement (June 2, 2010), available at http://new.abanet.org 
/calendar/civil-false-claims-act-and-qui-tam-enforcement-2010/Documents/cen0cfc_Website 
_Brochure_5-7-10.pdf. 
 212. Letter from Jim Esquea, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., and 
Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen.l, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Senator Charles E. Grassley 
(Jan. 24, 2011), available at http://www.taf.org/DOJ-HHS-joint-letter-to-Grassley.pdf. 
 213. 2011 Mid-Year False Claims Act Update, GIBSON DUNN (July 14, 2011) 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2011Mid-YearFalseClaimsActUpdate.aspx.  In 
the first half of 2010 alone, the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts issued more than 
200 decisions citing the FCA.  2010 Mid-Year False Claims Act Update, GIBSON DUNN (July 9, 
2010), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Mid-YearFalseClaimsActUpdate 
.aspx. 
 214. See infra text accompanying notes 215–16. 
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jobs—including positions for agents and attorneys—all assigned to tackling 
fraud.216  An increased budget and staff should add to the number of FCA suits 
brought by the Department of Justice. 
D.  Economic Costs of the FERA Amendments 
The FERA amendments will also increase the cost of business for 
government contractors and subcontractors.  As the scope of potential liability 
increases, more potential defendants will take measures to avoid litigation.217  
In an effort to recover their costs, contractors facing a greater possibility of qui 
tam actions will likely pass the increased business costs to consumers, which 
includes the government.218  
Moreover, expanding the FCA to cover all transactions paid with money 
traceable to the government will hinder the reasonable and expeditious 
resolution of contract disputes, as relators will intervene in private contractual 
relationships, and cause longer, more costly litigation.219  Although FCA 
lawsuits have proliferated over the past two decades, the government declined 
to intervene in nearly two-thirds of these lawsuits, leaving them to be 
prosecuted only by relators.220  When the government declines to intervene, an 
“overwhelming majority” of cases result in no recovery,221 and although a 
substantial number are dismissed, they still result in lengthy and expensive 
litigation.222 
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III.  THE SOLUTION: A LIMITING LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OR JUDICIAL 
SOLUTION 
The presentment clause falls into the category of the adage, “you don’t know 
what you’ve got till it’s gone.”223  Described as the sine qua non of the FCA,224 
the requirement that a false claim actually be submitted defined the FCA’s 
scope by establishing clear outer limits.225  Because of the punitive 
consequences of FCA liability, the bright-line function fulfilled by the 
presentment requirement and utilized by the Supreme Court in Allison Engine 
was particularly important.226  Whether or not Congress foresaw the potential 
impact of the FERA amendments,227 the FCA now applies to a class of entities 
that should not be liable under the Act, and who will need protection from the 
statute.  The absence of the presentment requirement and the presence of the 
expanded definition of “claim,”228 provide no mechanism to prevent Chief 
Justice Roberts’s slippery-slope scenario from unfolding.229 
A.  A Legislative or Judicial Limitation 
A legislative amendment to the FCA would prevent a battle between 
Congress and the Supreme Court, such as the one that occurred over the mail- 
and wire-fraud statutes.230  Congress has two available solutions: change the 
language of the FCA so that the statute’s reach has clear outer boundaries, or 
provide for alternative-dispute-resolution options to weed out frivolous qui tam 
cases. 
1.  Legislative Solution 
Congress, in drafting the FERA amendments, not only reacted to the 
depressed economic climate, but also to a small number of cases with unusual 
                                                 
 223. JONI MITCHELL, Big Yellow Taxi, on LADIES OF THE CANYON (Reprise Records 1970). 
 224. United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 130, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(stating that the submission of a claim is not merely a “ministerial act” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 225. See United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 496 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (noting the consequences of the FCA remains the presentment clause), superseded by 
statute, FERA, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
18 and 31 U.S.C.). 
 226. See supra Part I.F. 
 227. Some lawmakers were clearly concerned about the FERA amendments.  See 155 CONG. 
REC. S4559 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Coburn) (calling FERA a “typical knee-
jerk reaction”). 
 228. See supra Part I.G.1–2. 
 229. See supra Part II.A. 
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230 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:201 
facts.231  Congress eliminated specific language from the statute,232 and created 
a vague limiting condition for liability to ensue: that the government money or 
property involved be “used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a 
Government program or interest.”233  Although Congress believed these FERA 
amendments would bring the FCA into the twenty-first century,234 it failed to 
grasp the complexities of conducting business in the modern age.  These 
amendments, which apply to the entire spectrum of FCA cases, prevent 
businesses from clearly discerning when they have violated the FCA and thus 
subjected themselves to damages and fines. 
Any amendment must reflect the real difference between doing business 
directly with the government and operating a business that has an attenuated 
connection to the government. Further, such an amendment must also account 
for the complexities of government contracting. 
First, Congress must define the ambiguous condition that the money or 
property at issue “advance a Government program or interest.”235  Any 
definition must answer several questions. For example, what is a government 
interest? How significant must the interest be? And, how should such money or 
property advance this government interest?  A definition that covered these 
points would give greater notice of the statute’s reach to contractors and 
members of the public.  Ideally, Congress would also introduce an intent 
element to § 3729(a)(1)(A), similar to the requirement inferred by the Supreme 
Court in Allison Engine.236  Ultimately, any amendment to the FCA needs to 
                                                 
 231. The False Claims Act Correction Act (S. 2041): Strengthening the Government’s Most 
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send a clear message that the statute does not and should not apply to every 
kind of fraud.237 
As an alternative to a statutory amendment, Congress could mandate 
arbitration or mediation.238  Such a requirement could mitigate the expense and 
time of litigation, while weeding out meritless qui tam cases,239 because when 
the government has agreed to arbitration in its contract, it is obliged to 
participate in the arbitration process just as any private party.240  Therefore, the 
government cannot avoid its contractual obligations merely by an FCA suit.241  
The Supreme Court has recognized that federal statutory claims are resolvable 
through arbitration,242 yet no provision exists requiring parties to FCA claims 
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 240. United States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 324 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 241. Id. 
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to go through initial arbitration or mediation before litigation.243  However, 
mediation in FCA cases is not uncommon, and courts may order mediation for 
the parties to agree on a settlement.244  Moreover, the Attorney General can, 
under § 3730(c)(5), resolve FCA disputes by arbitration or mediation if he so 
chooses.245 
Requiring alternative dispute resolution before litigation would mitigate the 
economic costs of the FERA amendments and act as a de minimis hurdle for 
cases that should not be in the formal judicial process.  Creating a buffer for 
federal courts will be particularly important as qui tam suits multiply. 
2.  A Judicial Solution: A Narrow Interpretation 
The alternative to a legislative solution is a judicial remedy—the Supreme 
Court could act as it did in Skilling to prevent the FCA from being 
unconstitutionally vague.246  Already, the FCA presents serious fair-notice 
concerns, as it has never been clear whether subcontractors who have a more 
attenuated relationship with the government are liable under the Act.247  The 
Supreme Court should clarify liability as the FCA was not designed to police 
the chemical company in Chief Justice Roberts’s hypothetical or the defense 
subcontractor who manufactures nuts and bolts for the U.S. Army.248 
The Supreme Court can limit the FCA by narrowly interpreting the Act’s 
new language.  FERA amended the definition of “claim” to include the 
requirement that the government’s money or property be “used on the 
Government’s behalf or to advance a Government program or interest.”249  The 
plain language of this addition is not indicative of its potential application, as it 
is ambiguous and statutorily undefined. 
In interpreting this term, the courts should look to the language of the 
statute, the statute’s design and objective,250 and the relevant legislative 
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history.251  If ambiguity still remains, the court may turn to the principle of 
lenity in favor of a narrower interpretation.252  Although the principle of lenity 
is usually reserved for criminal statutes, the Supreme Court has used it in civil 
contexts.253  Although the FCA’s criminal and civil provisions have been 
technically separated since 1982, the Tenth Circuit pointed out that the 
language of the civil statute has not materially changed and concluded “there is 
no reason to believe that the language should be interpreted any differently 
now than it should have been in 1909 (or 1982).”254 
Furthermore, given the Supreme Court’s recognition of the punitive nature 
of the FCA,255 extending the rule of lenity to the FCA makes sense.  
Regardless of the lenity doctrine, the Act’s legislative history and purpose 
provide the Court with sufficient support to construe the statute narrowly.  The 
legislative history reveals the FCA’s very specific purpose: protecting the U.S. 
Treasury against fraudulent claims,256 excluding garden-variety frauds.257  A 
common-sense interpretation of the government’s motive supports the position 
that Congress did not intend for the FCA to apply to every type of fraud. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In amending the FCA to reflect modern fraudulent conduct against the 
government, Congress hastily changed the statute, designed to protect the 
Federal Treasury, to instead cover fraudulent behavior with little or no 
connection to the government. 
The FCA’s unique inclusion of punitive damages and fines provisions, and 
its qui tam enforcement mechanism, demand that the consequences of any 
amendments be seriously considered. 
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Although the consequences of the FERA amendments cannot be predicted 
with certainty, the experience of the mail- and wire-fraud statutes serve as a 
clear warning of potential pitfalls.  Given the similarity between the FCA and 
those two statutes, Congress or the Supreme Court should act to protect parties 
that have not intentionally committed fraud against the government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
